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CIVIL RICO: THE LEGAL GALAXY'S BLACK HOLE
by
VIRGINIA M. MORGAN*
GENERAL OVERVIEW
Background
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) statute' was
enacted as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. Congress passed it
in response to a growing concern over the pervasive influence of organized crime
in America?3 The statute contains both criminal penalties and civil sanctions, and
civil RICO actions are available to both the government and to private individuals.
It is a complex, powerful, and controversial law. In its private civil version, RICO
is evolving into something quite different from the original conception of its en-
actors? It offers a federal forum and mandatory treble damages with attorneys fees
to successful plaintiffs. For these reasons, civil RICO claims are included with
increasing frequency in conventional labor disputes, pension benefit claims, and
wrongful discharge actions
The civil portion of RICO provides a private civil action to injured persons
and authorizes recovery of treble damages for injury sustained "by reason of a
violation of § 1962." 5 Section 1962 sets forth the prohibited activities. RICO
specifically defines a number of terms, one of which is "racketeering activity."
Each defined term has a particular meaning in the context of the statute. An
understanding of the terms is essential to interpretation. "Racketeering activity"
is defined as any act "chargeable" under several generically described state
criminal laws, any act "indictable" under numerous specific federal criminal pro-
visions, including mail and wire fraud, and any "offense punishable" under federal
law involving bankruptcy, security-fraud, or drug related activities.6 Specifical-
ly included in the list of racketeering activity are several types of labor related
*J.D., University of Toledo (1975); B.S., University of Michigan (1968). Virginia M. Morgan is a United States
Magistrate in the Eastern.District of Michigan and former Assistant United States Attorney in Detroit. This
paper was oqginf lly presented at the January, 1988 meeting of the Committee on Development of Law under
the NLRAfahd the ABA Section on Labor and Employment Law.
The statements expressed in the paper are the personal views of the author.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Belinda Friis, Barbara Radke, and Robert Morgan
in the research, preparation and editing of this paper.
'18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985 & 1986).
2See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 584-600 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan), 115 CONG. REC. 5872-75, 5884-85
(1969) (same), Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (Statement of
Findings and Purpose).
'Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3287 (1985). (Marshall, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Sedimal.
4See, e.g., Shepard, Horn, & Duston: RICO and Employment Law, 3 LAB. LAw. 267-286 (1987) [hereinafter
Shepard]; Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3277 & n.1.
518 U.S.C. § 19 6 1-1964(c) (1979).
618 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
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crimes, e.g., embezzlement of union funds, theft or embezzlement of pension
funds, and unlawful payments and loans to labor unions. The inclusion of wire
and mail fraud can bring many ordinary commercial transactions and, possibly,
unfair labor practices not connected with organized crime, within the terms of
RICO. A requirement of a RICO claim is that the defendant cormnit two or more
of these acts of racketeering activity, commonly known as predicate acts, to
establish a pattern.
While the focus of this paper is on the civil aspects of RICO, it is important
to remember that Congress provided heavy criminal penalties, including im-
prisonment, fines, and forfeiture, for violation of these same provisions 7 Con-
gress also provided for private suits in a far reaching civil enforcement scheme
The statute provides as follows:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
Section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United
States District Court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.9
Section 196210 sets out the prohibited acts. These are summarized as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income de-
rived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity...
to use or invest ... any part of such income ... in acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which
is engaged in ... interstate commerce.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity . . . to acquire or maintain ... any interest in or control of any
enterprise...
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise ... to conduct or participate in the conduct of such enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity...
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the pro-
visions of (a), (b), or (c) ....
For example, liability under § 1962(c), requires a plaintiff to show (1) conduct
(2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.'I
RICO has so far survived all challenges based on its constitutionality. Both
challenges based on first amendment claims and claims of a right to privacy in
one's associations have been rejected. 2 The statute is neither unconstitutionally
718 U.S.C. § 1963.
818 U.S.C. § 1964.
918 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
1018 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d).
I"Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285; Sun Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir. 1987).
12See, United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1092 (1983); United
States v. Rubio, 727 E2d 786 (9th Cir. 1983).
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ambiguous13 nor vague.' 4 It does not violate due process as unconstitutionally
punishing the status of being a "reputed organized crime member" and does not
violate the double jeopardy clause.' 5 Its forfeiture penalties do not violate the
eighth amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.'
6
In Sedima v. Imrex,'7 the leading Supreme Court case interpreting RICO, the
Court held the statute applicable not only to "organized crime," but also to or-
dinary commercial transactions. The case involved a business dispute over prof-
its and net proceeds. Sedima, a Belgian corporation, had entered into a joint ven-
ture with Imrex Co. to provide electronic components to a Belgian firm. The buyer
was to order parts through Sedima; Imrex was to obtain the parts in this country
and ship them to Europe. The two companies were to split the net proceeds.
Sedima became convinced that Imrex was presenting inflated bills and collecting
for non-existent expenses. Sedima filed an action in federal district court in New
York alleging common law claims of fraud and breach of contract, and RICO
claims based on predicate acts of wire and mail fraud. Claiming injury in the
amount of the alleged over-billing, Sedima sought treble damages and attorney
fees. The lower court dismissed the RICO counts for failure to state a claim,
holding that the complaint must allege a "RICO-type injury" which it defined
as a racketeering or competitive injury analogizing to anti-trust law. A divided
panel of the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
a plaintiff in a private action need not prove a "racketeering injury" as opposed
to an injury resulting from the predicate acts themselves. The Court further held
that private actions are not limited to only defendants with prior convictions for
predicate acts or criminal RICO violations. This ruling struck down the judicially-
created limitation, which several lower courts imposed, requiring a prior criminal
conviction as a prerequisite to civil RICO liability.'8
In so holding, the Court emphasized that the RICO statute is to be read broad-
ly, and found that RICO's history, its language, or considerations of policy did
not support the prior conviction limitation. Indeed, every indication was to the
contrary.19
Specific Requirements
1. Pattern
The pattern consists of a series of predicate acts. In discussing the require-
13United States v. Field, 432 F.Supp. 55, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afd, 578 F2d 1371 (2nd Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 801 (1978). (General organizer of Longshoreman's association charged with criminal RICO offense
predicated in unlawful payments for employee in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 186.)
'aUnited States v. Swiderski, 593 F2d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979).
IsUnited States v. Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547, 548-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
l6United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 388-89 (2nd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
17 Sedima, 574 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 741 F.2d 482, (1984). rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
[$See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 503.
19 Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3281-3284, 3286.
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ment that the plaintiff must prove a "pattern of racketeering activity" as one of
the elements of its case, the Court in Sedima recognized that the statute requires
at least two acts to constitute a pattern. Two of the acts must have been commit-
ted within ten years of each other.2 However, the Court stated that the word "re-
quires" is not synonymous with the word "means." That is to say that while two
acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient. The Court explained:
The target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of
legitimate business normally requires more than one single 'racketeering ac-
tivity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of
continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern.2
The Court noted that Congress indicated that "criminal conduct forms a pat-
tern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results,
participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated
by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." 
22
Although not a determinative two-pronged test, the Court indicated that con-
tinuity of activity plus an inter-relationship among the acts will constitute a pat-
tern. The circuits which have considered this issue after Sedima are split on what
the Court meant by continuity plus relationship combining to form a pattern. At
least the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that predicate acts
which are part of one criminal scheme are sufficient for the pattern requirement.
23
Another group of courts, including the Eighth Circuit, has held that more than
one fraudulent or criminal scheme is necessary to establish a pattern.24 Thus, four
mailings sent over a period of months to cover up a series of alleged kickbacks
would show one criminal scheme. In those courts where only one scheme is re-
quired, the mailings would demonstrate continuity plus relationship, and pose
a threat of continuing activity. As such, the acts would comprise a pattern for the
purpose of maintaining a civil RICO claim.
20§ 1961(5). The statute of limitations for all civil RICO actions is four years, by analogy to the Clayton Act,
but the court has chosen not to decide the appropriate time for accrual of a RICO claim. See, Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2767 (1987).
2 1Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 & n.14.
221d.
23Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F2d 966,971 (llth Cir. 1986);
R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985); Sun Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Dier-
dorff, 825 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir. 1987); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegon, 804 F2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986)
(predicate acts must constitute "separate transactions" to form a pattern). Compare Yellow Bus Lines v. Union
Local 639, 839 F2d 782, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1988); (acts of vandalism and intimidation in pursuit of a unitary
goal). See also, United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 189-91 (2nd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3230
(1987) (criminal case rejecting an effort to require two separate schemes).
24Holmberg v. Morrisette, 800 F2d 205,209-10 (8th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1953 (1987); Superior
Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1986) (all predicate acts committed in furtherance of a single
scheme not pattern); Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925,927-28 (10th Cir. 1987) (petition for cert. filed
Oct. 15, 1987); International Data Bank v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 1987); Medallion TV Enter-
prises v. SelecTV, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1290, 1296-97 (C.D. Cal. 1986) aff'd, 833 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1987);
Northwest Trust Bank/O'Hare v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 832 (N.D. 111. 1985).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:2
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2. Enterprise
The issue of what constitutes the enterprise must also be properly alleged
in order to state a RICO claim. The statutory definition states that an enterprise
"includes any individual, partnership, cooperation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity." 25 The enterprise may be an association strictly for criminal purposes
without any legitimate goals.
2 6
RICO does not require that the alleged racketeering conduct be the conduct
of the alleged enterprise. It only requires that the defendant directly or indirect-
ly conduct or participate in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of rack-
eteering activity. In other words, there must be a "nexus" between the enterprise
and the racketeering activity.27 A strike for recognition of the union as a collec-
tive bargaining representative is an activity sufficiently related to the company's
ongoing role as a business enterprise and employer to establish the requisite
nexus.28
Depending on the section of RICO alleged, the same entity may be both the
plaintiff and the enterprise.29 Some courts have held that the enterprise may also
be a defendant in the RICO case and that a corporation may conspire with its own
officers, agents, and employees,30 but others have not allowed this practice
31
Logic alone may dictate that one entity may not serve as both the enterprise
and the person who participates in the enterprise through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity. However, exceptions to the non-identity rule may be made where the
organization is created solely for illegal purposes and where corrupt directors or
controlling partners operate it to the detriment of third parties. 2 Where union
employees engage in a pattern of unlawful or corrupt acts in the conduct of the
union's affairs, they may properly be RICO defendants without regard to whether
the union (the enterprise) itself is corrupt, whether the union authorized the acts,
or whether the union benefited from the actions.
2518 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
26United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
2718 U.S.C. § 1962(c); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1331-32 (5th Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1004 (1984); Sun Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d at 194-95.
28Yellow Bus Lines, 839 F.2d at 795. (Edwards, J., concurring).
29Sun Savings & Loan Ass 'n, 825 F.2d at 194 & n.6; Yellow Bus Lines, 839 F.2d at 789-90.
30United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983); Wilcox v.
First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 815 F2d 522, 529-30 (9th Cir. 1987).
3t Yellow Bus Lines, 839 F.2d at 791-92. McCullough v. Suter, 757 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1985); Schrieber
Dist. v. Serv-Well Furniture, 806 F2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689
F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); Seville Industrial Machine Corp. v. Southmost
Machinery Corp., 567 F Supp. 1146, 1151 (D.C.N.J. 1983), affd in part, rev'd in part, 742 F.2d 786 (3rd Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985).
"2Yellow Bus Lines, 839 F.2d at 790, discussing United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961.
CIVIL RicoFall, 19881
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3. Injury
The Court in Sedima perceived no separate "racketeering injury" require-
ment and noted that "racketeering activity" consists of no more and no less than
commission of a predicate act.33 If a defendant engages in a pattern of racketeer-
ing in a manner forbidden by the statute and if the racketeering activities injure
plaintiff in his business or property, plaintiff has a civil RICO claim.
As an example, a civil RICO claim may be sufficiently alleged where the
claim is that a bank and several of its officers fraudulently charged excessive in-
terest rates on loans. Plaintiffs interest rate was pegged to the bank's prime rate,
and the bank had lied to plaintiff with respect to the prime rate. Consequently,
the rate charged to plaintiff was too high. If this scheme to defraud was carried
on through the mails, i.e., if several letters were sent in furtherance of the scheme,
a RICO claim is stated through the predicate acts of mail fraud.34 The mailings
constitute the pattern of racketeering activity by means of which the defendants
conducted, or participated in the conduct of, the bank's operations. Even if the
only injuries alleged were the excessive interest charges themselves, this is enough
to allege a claim.
However, the injury must be more than incidental. So, where the union claims
only injuries consisting of attorneys fees and costs related to decertification pro-
ceedings alleged to have been unlawfully influenced by the defendant employer,
no RICO damages are stated, and the RICO action cannot be maintained.3 5 This
injury must be economic or property related, not personal; and claims of emo-
tional distress are not cognizable under RICO.36
APPLICATION TO LABOR LAW
Union, Management Relations
A clear target of RICO, as seen from the legislative history and government
prosecutions, was the infiltration of organized crime into labor unions.3 7 Several
of the listed predicate acts deal directly with labor related crimes 8 Government
prosecutions of labor racketeering within locals of the Teamsters and several other
unions39 have frequently set the stage for subsequent civil RICO actions.
13Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3284-85.
34 American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Haraco, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985) (per curiam) (decided on the
same day as Sedina and affirmed the 7th Circuit, see, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984)).
35Local 355 v. Pier 66, 599 F. Supp. 761, 762 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
36 Drake v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 782 E2d 638,644 (6th Cir. 1986) (injury at work due to exposure to chemicals
not cognizable under RICO); Kouvakas v. Inland Steel Co., 646 E Supp. 474, 477 (N.D. Ind. 1986); Bast
v. A. H. Robbins, 616 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (no recovery under RICO for injury from I.U.D.).
37Blakey & Goldstruck, On the Waterfront: RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 AM. CRtm. L. REV. 341 (1980).
38See 18 U.S.C. § 664, § 1954 (1979) (embezzlement of pension and welfare funds); 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1975)
(illegal payments or loans to labor unions and bribery of union officials in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act),
29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1982) (embezzlement of union assets).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Presser, CR-86-114 (White, J.) (N.D. Ohio); United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d
1183 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Caparole, 806 F.2d 1487 (lth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 4365
[Vol. 22:2
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In United States v. Local 560 of Intern. Broth. of Teamsters,4° the government
claimed that several individual defendants, "the Provenzano group," allegedly
acquired an interest in and effectively dominated Teamsters Local 560 through
a pattern of racketeering activities, including murder and extortion, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b), (c) and (d). The district court concluded that Local 560
was a "captive labor organization" and enjoined certain defendants from any fur-
ther contacts with Local 560, removed the current members of the Local's Ex-
ecutive Board and replaced the Board with a temporary trusteeship until free elec-
tions could be held. The Third Circuit affirmed this action.
The persons alleged to be injured were the members of the union, and the
property interest was alleged to be Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)
and the Labor Management Reporting & Disclosure Act (LMRDA) guaranteed
union rights." The injury was accomplished through a series of systematic acts
of intimidation which included the June, 1961 murders of Anthony Castellitto,
the August, 1961, appointment of Salvatore Provenzano to the position of trustee
formerly occupied by Castellitto, the September, 1961, appointment of Salvatore
Briguglio, the alleged murderer or Castellitto, as business agent, to name only
a few.42 The government sought only injunctive and equitable remedies as relief.
The district court's analysis of the RICO elements differed in part from that of
the government which had referred to Local 560 as the "enterprise." The lower
court found that the Provenzano group was the enterprise for the purposes of §
1962(c), and rejected the notion that LMRDA remedies are the exclusive remedies
available in combating the extortion of a member's rights under that statute4 3
On appeal, the defendants argued a number of issues 4 The court held inter
alia that extortion of a membership's statutory labor rights constituted a Hobbs
Act violation and was a predicate act. Defendants claimed that LMRDA rights
are intangible property rights and only extortion of tangible property is cognizable
as a Hobb's Act violation. The court rejected this argument stating that a member-
ship's intangible property right to democratic participation in the affairs of the
union is properly considered extortable "property" for purposes of the Hobbs
Act.45 The defendants also argued what the government's burden of proof should
(1987) (labor union officials receiving kickbacks from insurance agents); United States v. Pecora, 798 F.2d
614 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 949 (1987) (payoffs made to union officials); United States v. Delkar,
757 F.2d 1390 (3rd Cir. 1985) (control of painters union through intimidation and violence) United States v.
Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289 (11th Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1209 (1983) (widespread corruption ofwaterfront
union officials).
40780 F.2d 267 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2247 (1986).
41LMRA (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 157; LMRDA (Landrum-Griffin Act), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1982).
42See 780 F.2d 267, 271-272 (3rd Cir. 1985) (discussion of predicate acts).
43United States v. Local 560, 550 FSupp. 511, 518 (D.C.N.J. 1982).
"Several interesting evidentiary matters, such as admission of twenty-year-old newspaper and magazine ar-
ticles, were discussed in the appellate opinion but are outside the scope of this paper.
4"780 F.2d at 282. The Court attempted to explain at footnote 16 how this holding did not conflict with its
prior decision in United States v. Boffa, 688 F2d 919 (3rd Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983). Boffa
held that mail fraud reached a scheme to deprive members of "honest and faithful services" of union leaders
because of the fiduciary duties imposed on union officials pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 501, but could not sup-
Fall, 1988] CIVIL Rico
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be in a civil RICO action (where remedies are sought pursuant to § 1964). The
appellate court held that the standard of proof for the government is the
"preponderance of the evidence." It specifically rejected the standards of "beyond
a reasonable doubt" and "clear and convincing." 46 Additionally, the court held
that even though the union appointments were in technical compliance with union
officer eligibility, the appointments still could serve as predicate acts.
7
Currently, much speculation and controversy exists regarding the govern-
ment's alleged plans to place in trusteeship via a civil RICO action not just one
Teamsters local, but the entire union, following the indictment of its President
Jackie Presser."8 As of the date of this paper, such action has not been filed.
In addition to government actions, private parties are bringing civil RICO
claims against unions. Following the criminal conviction of Eugene Boffa, Sr.,
owner of a trucking company, and Francis Sheeran, head of Teamsters Local 326,
for various criminal RICO violations, the affected employees who had lost their
jobs filed a suit for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, breach of the
union's duty of fair representation and violation of RICO. The defendants were
the union, Boffa's company, and Inland Container to which Boffa's company had
previously leased drivers.' 9 The court held the RICO claim viable, although the
remainder of the claims were barred because of the hybrid § 301 action's50 six-
month statute of limitations.
51
Preemption and Exclusivity
Although NLRB jurisdiction generally preempts the jurisdiction of both state
and federal courts,5 2 there is a question whether RICO claims are preempted from
federal court review where the alleged predicate acts are also unfair labor
practices.
The NLRB is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine what is and is
not an unfair labor practice... [F]ederal courts do not have jurisdiction over
activity which is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA] and they must
defer to the exclusive competance of the National Labor Relations Board 3
port a scheme to deprive employees of Section 7 rights under the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157, as Congress did
not intend ULPs to have criminal consequences. Boffa may be of limited precedential value in light of the subse-
quent Supreme Court decision in United States v. McNally, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987). See discussion, infra.
46780 F.2d at 279 & n.12 relying on Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754.
47780 F.2d at 286.
4 8Nat'l. L.J., Nov. 23, 1987, at 3, 10.
49See United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 939 (3rd Cir. 1982); United States v. Sheeran, 600 F.2d 112, 120
(3rd Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2095 (1983); and discussion in Shepard: Rico and Employment Law,
supra, at pages 271-273.
-0DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158-60 (1983).
5 1Creamer v. General Teamsters Local 326, 560 F. Supp. 495 (D. Del. 1983), affd on rehearing, 579 F Supp.
1284, 1288-89 (1984).
52See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 187 (1978); San Diego
Bldg. Trades v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
13Kaiser Steel v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 83 (1982) (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959)).
[Vol. 22:2
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The trend appears to be that unless the claim is directly premised upon a vi-
olation of Section 302, the specifically denominated predicated act in the RICO
statute, a predicate act which is also an unfair labor practice will be held pre-
empted.
In one example, a hotel and restaurant worker's union contended that the
employer, Pier 66, influenced its employees to petition the NLRB seeking the
decertification of the union as their exclusive bargaining agent, and monetarily
induced them to do so by offering promotions, wage increases, and other benefits.54
These alleged bribes would violate § 302(a)(3) of the LMRDA, 55 federal RICO
laws, and state right to work laws. They also are unfair labor practices under §
8(a)(1),56 forbidding employer interference with employees' rights to organize and
bargain collectively.57 The union filed an unfair labor practice charge against the
employer. The NLRB investigated the charges, but found no evidence of imper-
missible employer assistance with the decertification effort and refused to issue
a complaint. The union's appeal to the General Counsel was denied. The union
then filed both a motion for reconsideration and new claims with the Board, as
well as a civil RICO action in U.S. District Court. The district court granted the
defendant employer's motion for summary judgment finding that the RICO ac-
tion was simply a means of circumventing the NLRB's unfavorable decisions
regarding the unfair labor practice charges.
A similar result was reached in Butchers' Union Local No. 498 v. S. D.C. Inv.,
Inc. ,ss where the court found that all claims except those directly premised on §
186 (§ 302) were preempted. Plaintiff labor union's attempt to organize employees
of S. D.C. was thwarted by S.D.C's immediate recognition of the National Maritime
Union (NMU) as the bargaining representative at S. D.C.'s new slaughterhouse
operation. Two days after recognition, S. D.C. executed a collective bargaining
agreement with NMU. Joined as defendants in the civil RICO action against S.D.C.
and NMU were the lawyers who had represented the employer. The individual
defendants were officers of S.D.C. and agents of NMU, as well as partners,
members and employees of the law firms. Plaintiffs alleged that recognition of
NMU was part of a conspiracy to reduce labor costs, maximize profits for S.D.C.,
and enrich both NMU and the law firm defendants. Plaintiffs claimed that the law
firm engaged in hiring and paying organizers of NMU (payments made in the form
of travel expenses, reimbursements for meals, hotel and autos, as well as direct
payments of wages).59 They alleged as predicate acts violations of 29 U.S.C. § 186
(unlawful payments to labor organizers under § 302) and mail and wire fraud.
54local 355, 599 F Supp. at 761.
5529 U.S.C. § 186(a)(3) (1975).
5629 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1975).
5729 U.S.C. § 157 (1975) [Section 7 of the NLRA].
58631 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Cal. 1986).
59 d. at 1003.
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The defendants argued that the claims were preempted under the NLRA.
Plaintiffs claimed injuries resulting from three acts: (1) unlawful recognition of
NMU; (2) execution of the collective bargaining agreement with NMU; and (3)
S.D.C.'s failure to hire the locals' members. Because these acts are chargeable as
unfair labor practices, the court, relying on San Diego Bldg. Trades, supra, found
preempted those claims where the factual resolution was within the exclusive jur-
isdiction of the NLRB, i.e., where the resolution depended upon whether recogni-
tion of NMU was lawful, whether a collective bargaining agreement was executed,
and whether S. D.C. deliberately refused to hire members of a local 6O However,
the § 302 claims survived the preemption challenge. The court stated that the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the NLRB is not without statutorily created exceptions al-
lowing for causes of action in federal court, e.g., §§ 301 and 303. Congress clearly
provided that the violation of § 302 suffices to predicate civil liability under RICO
and the claims grounded on such activities were not preempted, even if the proof
of such claims would require resolution of labor law questions. 6'
The court considered and rejected the holding and reasoning of Pier 66,
where the plaintiff union had complained that the employer's monetary in-
ducements for decertification violated § 302 and where the court held the viola-
tions were "nothing more than an unfair labor practice." The S.D.C. court noted
that the Pier 66 decision seemed to be based on whether § 302 provided for civil
or criminal relief. The S.D. C. court stated that that distinction misconstrued the
nature of the appropriate inquiry. RICO provides monetary damages if a defen-
dant engages in conduct indictable under § 302. Thus, "the fact that § 186 itself
does not provide for monetary damages appears simply irrelevant."
62
The S.D.C. court found that the claims of wire and mail fraud, where the
underlying fraud was a question within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB,
were preempted.63 The court analogized to the preemption of Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) claims in Laborer's Health & Welfare Trust
Fund for Northern California v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete, Inc.64 In that
case, the trust fund claimed that the employer had failed to make contributions
to the fund as required under the terms of an expired collective bargaining agree-
ment. The only reason the employer would have been liable for the contributions
was because of a "labor law requirement" that employers continue contributions
6/d. at 1005.
61 d. at 1006-07.
621d. at 1009.
631d. at 1010-11. The court stated that § 186 was different from mail and wire fraud predicate acts and the in-
clusion of § 186 violations as a specific predicate act suggested that Congress was being selective as to what
activities were being removed from the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor law. The court stated: "The viola-
tion of no other labor statute constitutes a RICO predicate act." Id. at 1009. Whatever the validity of its con-
clusion, the court is clearly in error in that statement. Violations of 29 U.S.C., § 501(c) (embezzlement from
union fund), 18 U.S.C. § 664 (embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), and 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs
Act), are all specific predicate acts listed in the statute.
64108 S. Ct. 830 (1988).
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during collective bargaining. Because labor law was solely determinative of the
issue of the employer's liability and the duty to make payments was a consequence
of the broader duty to protect the collective bargaining process, the claim was
within the jurisdiction of the NLRB and plaintiffs ERISA claims were preemp-
ted. In affirming the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court rejected the government's
argument that the narrow scope of the remedies under the NLRA justified district
court jurisdiction of the ERISA claims and allowance of attorney's fees, pre-
judgment interest, and liquidated damages. The court noted that Congress
evidenced no intention to provide ERISA plan trustees with a preferred procedure
for an employer's violation to bargain with the union.
When considering the issue of NLRB jurisdiction, other courts have reached
somewhat different results in the wire and mail fraud area.65 A RICO predicate
act of mail fraud 66 has been held to support a scheme to deprive union members
of "the honest and faithful" services of union officials as provided for in 29 U.S.C.
§ 501,67 but may not support a scheme to deprive employees of rights created by
Section 7 of the NLRA. The argument that a violation of union rights under Sec-
tion 7 is a RICO predicate act because of the "remedial nature of the [NLRA]
and the primacy of the NLRB in resolving unfair labor practice disputes" was
specifically rejected. 8 The NLRB has been held not to have primary jurisdiction
over the democratic rights created by § 411 and enforced by § 412 of the LMRDA69
Section 412 gives union members a direct cause of action against the union and
its officers for infringement of their Section 411 rights, and predicate acts grounded
on these rights are not preempted 70
All predicate acts of mail fraud or wire fraud in the context of any scheme
to deprive persons of intangible rights may be suspect following the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. McNally! 1 That case held that the mail fraud
statute does not prohibit schemes to defraud people of their intangible rights to
honest and impartial government. Some earlier decisions affirming criminal con-
victions of union officials for mail fraud in furtherance of a scheme to defraud
the union of their "honest and faithful services" have been vacated in light of
McNally and remanded for further consideration.7 2 However, where the scheme
can be interpreted to have an economic or other property basis, RICO claims will
65 United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919 (3rd Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1002, (1983).
6618 U.S.C. § 1341 (1979).
67Although the mailing may be a valid predicate act for RICO, a scheme to defraud a union of the intangible
rights to the honest and faithful services of its officials does not appear to be viable following the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. McNally, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2879 (1987), where the Court held that the mail
fraud statute does not prohibit schemes to defraud people of their intangible rights to honest and impartial
government.
68
Boffa, 688 F.2d at 927.
6929 U.S.C. § 411, § 412 (1982).
7 0United States v. Teamsters Local 560, 780 F.2d at 282 & n.16.
7t107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987); see supra note 31.
72See, e.g., United States v. Price, 788 F2d 234 (7th Cir. 1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 3254 (1987).
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still be viable. 3 Subsequent cases have explained McNally and held that the mail
fraud statute still reaches schemes involving intangible property rights 74 Con-
fidential business information is within reach of the statute, and a scheme to
defraud does not require a monetary loss.75 Thus, predicate acts involving mail-
ings in furtherance of such a scheme should still be valid.
Nevertheless, predicate acts related to mail fraud in the context of economic
or property loss remain troublesome. Bankruptcy fraud is one of the specifical-
ly prohibited acts in the RICO statute. Rejection of collective bargaining
agreements in plans of reorganization in bankruptcy may present questions of
preemption, jurisdiction, and estoppel 76 Where rejection of agreements occurs
with related companies, a union may claim RICO violations, alleging that acquisi-
tion of the companies, followed by filing bankruptcy based on misrepresentations
constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity and states a RICO claim. Although
each bankruptcy resulted in court-approved rejection of collective bargaining
agreements, the union may argue that the concommitant loss of union members'
jobs should be cognizable as an injury under RICO.
However, if the RICO action is merely a device to avoid the proper jurisdic-
tion of the bankruptcy courts, the NLRB, and federal appellate courts, the doc-
trines of res judicata and collateral estoppel may bar it. Res judicata and collateral
estoppel will generally not be a successful bar to RICO claims, for the reason that
the doctrines require that a party have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the claims in a proper forum7 7 Further, RICO has been modeled after the antitrust
laws?78 Res judicata does not bar a plan of confirmation from subsequent attack
on the grounds that it violates antitrust laws, and analogously, a claim should not
be barred from attack on the grounds that it violates RICO.
This conclusion has a detrimental effect on concepts of judicial economy and
a party's reliance on legal process and court judgments. Where a party has relied
on acquisition and operation of a business pursuant to orders of the bankruptcy
court, it may later be compelled to litigate previously unraised claims of fraud
in a civil RICO action. Although troubling, this conclusion appears to follow from
the Supreme Court's holding in Sedima and the statute's legislative history.
The Second Circuit's opinion in Sedima recognized "the extraordinary, if
not outrageous," uses to which civil RICO has been put 7 9 However, in revers-
7"United States v. Runnels, 833 F2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1987).
74Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
75Id.
76See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Moroun, 85-CV-1333-DT (E.D. Mich.) (no decision, case pending).
77See In re Turner, Bankr. Case No. 584-501 (N.D. Ohio, White, J.) (Bankruptcy court an improper forum
in which to litigate RICO claims) (unpublished opinion); Cook County v. Midcon Corp., 773 F.2d 892, 908
(7th Cir. 1985) (RICO action not barred where only some aspects of an allegedly fraudulent scheme were
at issue in a prior suit) (dicta)).
78Anderson v. Janovich, 543 F. Supp. 1124, 1129 (D.C. Wash. 1982).
79741 F.2d at 487.
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ing the appellate court, the Supreme Court stated:
It is not for the judiciary to eliminate the private action in situations where
Congress has provided it .... The 'extraordinary' uses to which RICO has
been put appear to be primarily the result of the breadth of the predicate of-
fenses, in particular, the inclusion of wire, mail, and securities fraud, and
the failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of
pattern . .. o
Thus it appears that the courts must await legislative modification to limit RICO
actions.
Arbitrability of RICO Claims
The Supreme Court recently held in Shearson/American Express v.
McMahon"1 that RICO claims are arbitrable. The case arose out of a brokerage
agreement. The customers of the brokerage firm filed suit in federal district court
alleging claims for violation of the anti-fraud provision in § 10(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10 b-5 and RICO. Defendants moved to com-
pel arbitration. The Court held that both the RICO claims and the Exchange Act
fraud claims were arbitrable, noting that there was nothing in either the RICO
statute or its legislative history even arguably to evince congressional intent to
exclude civil RICO claims from the dictates of the federal arbitration act 2 The
defendants' argument of irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and the pur-
poses underlying RICO were found to be without merit. The Court relied on its
earlier decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. ,83
a case holding antitrust claims arising out of international commercial transac-
tions arbitrable. RICO's complexity is not sufficient to ward off arbitration. The
adaptability of arbitration and access to an arbitrator's expertise was found to rebut
the view that an arbitral tribunal could not properly handle the issues. Neither
does the overlap between criminal and civil RICO, nor the public interest in its
enforcement preclude arbitrations
4
Formerly, a plaintiff with labor-related statutory claims of ERISA and RICO
was not required to exhaust arbitration remedies available on the ERISA claims
8 5
The reasoning was based on public policy, and the right of aggrieved employees
to maintain actions in federal court, even where the underlying claims of wrongful
discharge were subject to mandatory and binding arbitration.8 6 In holding that
80Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3287.
81107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
821d. at 2338; See generally 9 U.S.C. § 1, et. seq.
83473 U.S. 614 (1985).
84Price, 107 S. Ct. at 2344.
8 5E.g., McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492 (D.C.N.J. 1985).
8 6See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (discharged employee could institute a Title VII
claim even where he lost racial basis for discharge claim submitted to binding arbitration); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (employees who had submitted wage claims unsuccessfully
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arbitration was not required, the court cited cases where arbitrators were pow-
erless to grant the aggrieved employees the broad range of relief authorized. How-
ever, in cases of civil RICO actions brought by non-government plaintiffs, relief
is probably limited to money damages and not injunctive or other equitable
remedies
7
The Third Circuit had held before the Supreme Court's decision in McMahon
that some RICO claims were arbitrable and others were not depending on the
kinds of predicate acts alleged8 8 This decision was vacated and remanded for
reconsideration in light of McMahon.
Thus, it appears that RICO claims in a labor context are arbitrable, if they
arise under the arbitration agreement between the parties. The fact that they are
complex and may ask for broad relief will not bar an arbitrator from resolving
them.
THE FUTURE OF Rico
The breadth of RICO's reach continues to evolve. The Supreme Court has
struck down judicial attempts to limit RICO's scope which required prior criminal
convictions of defendants and "racketeering type" injuries. The statute has been
held clearly applicable to ordinary commercial transactions and is to be applied
broadly, in the absence of congressional modification.
The holding that civil RICO claims are arbitrable may slow the momentum
for congressional reform of RICO, which in large part the securities industry had
pushed.
Nevertheless, several legislative modifications are now before Congress
although most Congress watchers are not optimistic for their passage 9 Court
watchers expect the Supreme Court to take a case in the next year on the pattern
requirement to resolve the split in the circuits. Professor Robert Blakey, one of
the drafters of the original statute, has stated that the "trashy cases" are gone, and
that judges may soon start imposing Rule 11 sanctions on plaintiffs who bring
frivolous RICO claims.0 The Department of Justice is on record as favoring
legislation which would greatly restrict the ability of private parties to bring civil
to arbitration committee as required by collective bargaining agreement could still bring separate action based
on same facts under Fair Labor Standards Act); McDonald v. West Branch 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (discharged
police employee allowed to file civil rights action in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on same
facts as arbitration).
87Religious Technology Center & Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987). But see cases holding otherwise cited by the court at 1081, and Blakely
v. Gettings, RICO: Basic Concepts-Cinil & Criminal Remedies, 53 Temple L. Q. 1014, 1038 (statutory language
provides for equitable relief).
8 8Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, 797 F.2d 1197 (3rd Cir. 1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 3204 (1987).
89See Nat'l L.J., Sept. 28, 1987 at 18-19.
90
1d.
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RICO claims.l The Judicial Conference of the United States is also in favor of
restricting the reach of civil RICO
2
Like the black hole in space, a small celestial body with an intense gravita-
tional field, RICO is a source of vast federal power to pull in those voyagers who
venture near its parameters. Although in some contexts the concept of prosecu-
torial discretion limits the reach of the statute, no such shield is found in private
civil RICO actions. Some courts have attempted to direct the reach of the statute
to those for whom it was originally intended, but in Sedima such limitations were
disallowed. Thus, it remains for Congress to modify the statute, or RICO, like
the U.S.S. Enterprise, will continue to boldly go where no man has gone before.
9 1Richard K. Willard, Asst. Atty. General, Civil Division, Department of Justice, interview in The Third
Branch, Vol. 19, No. 10, October, 1987.
9 2Report of The Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Sept. 21, 1987, Washington, D.C.,
pages 75-76.
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